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I. INTRODUCTION
THE  United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Direc-tor, Missouri Department of Health1 broke important legal groundin establishing a constitutional basis for the individual’s control
over life-sustaining treatment. Yet Cruzan offered little guidance to those
making treatment choices on behalf of incompetent patients. The Court
simply determined that it was constitutional for Missouri to require con-
tinued life-sustaining treatment in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that Nancy Cruzan would refuse such treatment in her current
circumstances.2
Cruzan left states free to adopt less-demanding evidentiary require-
ments to establish incompetent patients’ prior treatment preferences. The
Court also left states free to apply other standards to determine treat-
ment for patients who left no clear indication of their prior preferences.
As Justice O’Connor observed in her concurring opinion, “[T]he more
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding in-
* J.D., Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law Emerita, Washington University in St.
Louis.
1. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
2. Id. at 286–87.
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competents’ liberty interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the
States.” 3
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist described some of the
approaches states had taken to decision-making on behalf of incompetent
patients.4 He referred to cases adopting versions of the two major stan-
dards for such decisions: the subjective standard, which focuses on writ-
ten, oral, or behavioral indications of a formerly competent person’s
treatment preferences; and the objective standard (traditionally referred
to as the best interests standard), which focuses on how different treat-
ment options would affect the incompetent patient’s welfare.5
Like most legal and policy authorities, the Supreme Court focused on
the subjective standard.6 The competent individual’s liberty to make con-
temporaneous medical choices is grounded in the values of self-determi-
nation and autonomy.7 When patients lack the capacity to make their
own choices, most authorities, as well as medical ethicists, regard the per-
son’s previous competent preferences as the ideal way to resolve treat-
ment questions. But the subjective standard is insufficient to guide many
treatment decisions because relatively few people express clear and pre-
cise wishes about their future care. In such cases, decision makers must
look to the objective best interests standard for guidance on how to
proceed.
Although courts and legislatures favor the autonomy-based subjective
standard, it’s often impossible to apply. The need for a robust best inter-
ests standard has become increasingly obvious in the decades since
Cruzan. Yet, there is relatively little legal and scholarly guidance on this
standard. With the growing population of people diagnosed with demen-
tia, supplying greater guidance to treatment decision makers is
imperative.8
Dementia presents special challenges to decision makers applying the
best interests standard. People with dementia live for many years after
3. Id. at 292 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
4. There is no single legal definition of competency, but the generally accepted ap-
proach looks to the individual’s ability to understand and appreciate the information rele-
vant to a treatment choice. See generally Rebecca Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits in
End-of-Life Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 399, 401–02 (I. Glenn
Cohen et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits]. Unlike Nancy
Cruzan, many incompetent patients remain conscious and capable of having emotions,
desires, and views on how they want their lives to go. See infra text accompanying notes
99–134.
5. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270–78. For a discussion of the subjective standard and its
potential to conflict with the best interests standard, see Rebecca Dresser, Dementia, Disa-
bility, and Advance Directives: Defensible Legal Standards for Decisions about Future De-
mentia Care, in DISABILITY, HEALTH, LAW, AND BIOETHICS 77–88 (I. Glenn Cohen et al.
eds., 2020).
6. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286–87.
7. Id. at 272–73 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985)).
8. For an overview of these issues, see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING
CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 1–4 (2005).
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their diagnosis.9 Though they experience a progressive decline in cogni-
tive capacity, they remain able to participate in activities and interactions
for much of that time.10 As aging individuals, they are also vulnerable to
cancer, heart disease, and other life-threatening conditions.11 Determin-
ing whether to treat people with dementia for such conditions can be a
complex and, at times, controversial endeavor.
In this article, I analyze the best interests standard, focusing on three
topics that merit closer examination than they have received. In Part II, I
review what Cruzan said about the best interests standard, as well as how
state courts have applied the standard. Part III addresses two unresolved
issues in best interests decision-making. First, in determining how to pro-
mote the patient’s welfare, should the best interests standard consider the
patient’s life as a whole or only the patient’s contemporaneous circum-
stances? Second, should the best interests standard consider only the ben-
efits and burdens that patients themselves experience, such as pain and
pleasure, or should it also consider broader concerns, such as dignity and
personal privacy, even when patients are no longer concerned with such
matters?
In Part IV, I examine the process of evaluating the subjective exper-
iences of individual incompetent patients and suggest ways to improve
the process. I conclude by highlighting uncertainties in applying the best
interests standard to dementia patients. Surrogate decision makers and
clinicians need more legal guidance to determine permissible and imper-
missible treatment choices for conscious dementia patients.
II. LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE BEST INTERESTS
STANDARD
A. THE CRUZAN DISSENTS
Although the Supreme Court Justices focused on the subjective stan-
dard for treatment decision-making, Cruzan did include a brief discussion
of the best interests standard. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
argued that Missouri had violated what he saw as a constitutional man-
date “to care for Nancy Cruzan’s life in a way that gives appropriate re-
spect to her own best interests.”12 These interests, he contended, were
broader than any benefits and burdens that she herself would perceive if
her life-sustaining nutritional support were continued or withdrawn.13
Doctors said that Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state, with no
awareness of her surroundings.14 According to Justice Stevens, continued
life without consciousness is insufficient to give patients a contemporane-
9. See 2019 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N 5–6
(2019).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 43–45.
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 344–45.
14. Id. at 266 n.1 (majority opinion).
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ous interest in receiving life-sustaining interventions.15 If there were evi-
dence that Cruzan herself had previously regarded mere biological life as
valuable, then she would have an interest in continued nutritional sup-
port.16 But no such evidence existed, he noted.17 Moreover, like any
other person, Cruzan’s interests included an “interest in how she [would]
be thought of after her death by those whose opinions mattered to her.”18
Because her parents believed she would not want to be sustained in a
state of permanent unconsciousness, Stevens declared that her best inter-
ests would be served by a decision to withdraw treatment.19
At the same time, Stevens was careful to distinguish permanently un-
conscious patients like Cruzan from conscious patients. According to Ste-
vens, conscious, incompetent patients “have some interest in continuing
their lives, even if that interest pales in some eyes when measured against
interests in dignity or comfort.”20 In cases involving those patients, he
wrote, ascertaining the patient’s constitutional interests would be more
“complicated” than it is in patients with no reasonable prospect of resto-
ration to conscious awareness.21
In a second dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan presented a similar
conception of Cruzan’s interests. For permanently unconscious patients
like Cruzan, he wrote, “the sole benefit of medical treatment is being
kept metabolically alive.”22 On the other hand, he observed, many people
regard prolonged life “devoid of thought, emotion, and sensation” as
both “humiliating” and an unacceptable burden on loved ones.23 He cited
empirical findings that a high percentage of people would reject life-sus-
taining treatment for themselves in such circumstances.24
According to Brennan, these findings, together with the lack of evi-
dence that Cruzan herself valued life in an unconscious state, were suffi-
cient to support her parents’ request to remove the feeding tube.25 More
generally, he declared, unless they harbor “improper motives,” families
of permanently unconscious patients should be permitted to determine
which treatment decision would be best for the patients.26
According to these two Justices, best interests evaluations should not
rely solely on the impact a particular treatment decision will have on the
15. Id. at 344–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 351.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 344.
19. Id. at 356.
20. Id. at 347.
21. See id. at 350 n.22. A few state courts have also noted significant differences be-
tween evaluating the interests of conscious, incompetent patients and the interests of pa-
tients diagnosed in a state of permanent unconsciousness. See Rebecca Dresser, The
Conscious Incompetent Patient, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2002, at 9, 9–10.
22. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 309–12.
24. Id. at 312 n.11.
25. Id. at 301–02.
26. Id. at 328.
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incompetent patient in her current state.27 In their view, such evaluations
should also take into account burdens and benefits that would be impor-
tant to competent persons considering the patient’s situation.28 On this
view, matters like humiliation and dignity are relevant to the interests of
patients unable to perceive or care about such matters. As I describe be-
low, there is some legal and scholarly support for this conception of the
best interests standard. Yet, as Justice Stevens observed, this approach
can be complicated when applied to conscious, incompetent patients.
B. THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD IN THE LABORATORY OF THE
STATES
State court opinions offer the most extensive analysis of the best inter-
est standard in end-of-life decision-making. Although there is substantial
agreement on the standard’s meaning and application, there is disagree-
ment as well. I describe differences in how judges have interpreted the
standard below.
Courts use a few different terms to refer to the traditional best interests
standard, including the objective standard, benefit-burden standard, and
reasonable person standard.29 (Two other legal standards, the substituted-
judgment and limited-objective standards, contain both subjective and
objective elements.)30 All objective standards involve assessing and bal-
ancing various considerations affecting a specific incompetent patient’s
treatment situation.31 They incorporate judgments on what makes life
good or bad for people in general, such as pleasure and enjoyment on one
hand and pain and distress on the other.32 As one advisory group put it,
the best interests and other objective standards are based on “a societal
consensus, or the perspective of ‘a reasonable person,’ choosing as most
people would for themselves.”33 But as I discuss below, courts and com-
mentators differ on the normative judgments that belong in a best inter-
ests evaluation.
Decision-making approaches are classified as objective when they de-
pend on evidence about the patient’s welfare, rather than on evidence
about the patient’s end-of-life preferences before losing decision-making
capacity. Yet the objective label is somewhat misleading. Objective stan-
dards seek the best choice for a person in the patient’s circumstances, thus
adding a subjective element to the inquiry.34 Moreover, objective stan-
27. See supra notes 14–26 and accompanying text.
28. See supra notes 14–26 and accompanying text.
29. See Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits, supra note 4, at 401–05.
30. See generally ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS:
THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 112–22 (1989); Dresser, Autonomy and Its
Limits, supra note 4, at 404.
31. See Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits, supra note 4, at 404–05.
32. See id.
33. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE:
DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 55 (1992); see also BUCHANAN & BROCK,
supra note 30, at 123.
34. See Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits, supra note 4, at 404–05.
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dards focus on how various treatment options will affect the individual
patient’s well-being as an incompetent patient.35 Applying objective stan-
dards thus demands an inquiry into the personal, subjective world of the
incompetent patient. To the degree that objective standards require close
examination of an individual patient’s actual and anticipated responses to
different treatment options, they are subjective.36
In 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an influential decision
on treatment standards for incompetent patients in In re Conroy.37 In a
ruling on the care of Claire Conroy, a “barely conscious”38 patient with
advanced dementia, the court described factors that best interests evalua-
tions should consider: “the degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of
dignity probably resulting from the condition and treatment; the life ex-
pectancy and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; the vari-
ous treatment options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of
those options.”39 As Conroy noted, potential treatment burdens include
experiences like pain and suffering, and benefits include experiences like
“physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction.”40
Conroy also described the balance of benefits and burdens that could
justify forgoing treatment. According to the Conroy majority, treatment
could be withheld or withdrawn under the objective standard if the “net
burdens of the patient’s life . . . clearly and markedly outweigh the bene-
fits that the patient derives from life . . . [, and] the recurring, unavoidable
and severe pain of the patient’s life . . . [is] such that the effect of adminis-
tering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane.”41
Though the Conroy decision has been influential, its articulation of the
best interests standard has been criticized. A common criticism addresses
the “inhumane treatment” requirement for forgoing treatment. Judges
disagree on whether the best interests standard should permit withhold-
ing or withdrawing treatment in other circumstances too. For example, in
his Conroy dissent, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Joel Handler ques-
tioned the majority’s reliance on pain as the deciding factor.42 He favored
a broader approach in which factors such as severe illness, extensive
physical intrusion, and lack of dignity could also support a decision to
35. Id.
36. See James F. Drane & John L. Coulehan, The Best-Interest Standard: Surrogate
Decision Making and Quality of Life, J. CLINICAL ETHICS, Spring 1995, at 20, 23 (noting
that the best interests standard involves an “attempt to objectify the content of subjective
experience”); Eric C. Miller, Listening to the Disabled: End-of-Life Medical Decision Mak-
ing and the Never Competent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2889, 2901 (2006) (stating that the best
interest standard applies “objective standards outside the person . . . and standards subjec-
tive to the person”).
37. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
38. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 376–77
(1988).
39. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1231.
40. Id. at 1232.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1249 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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forgo life-sustaining interventions.43
In a later case, another New Jersey judge endorsed a position similar to
that of Justice Handler. In re Visbeck examined the situation of an elderly
woman who was cognitively impaired after having a stroke.44 Elizabeth
Visbeck was unable to eat on her own, and her son opposed surgery to
implant a feeding tube, arguing that this would simply prolong his
mother’s suffering.45 But the judge ordered the surgery, observing that,
although Visbeck was severely impaired, she appeared to be aware,
somewhat responsive, and unburdened by suffering.46 Based on the evi-
dence at hand, he noted, the benefits of the continued life that tube feed-
ing would provide outweighed any burdens that surgery and tube feeding
would impose on Visbeck.47
At the same time, the judge in Visbeck challenged Conroy’s inhumane-
treatment requirement, proposing that
suffering pain, even severe pain, is perhaps not the worst thing that
can befall a human being. I would suggest that for most of us it
would be far worse to suffer a very great loss of mental capacity, to
become non-functioning, to be totally dependent upon others, to
have no privacy in the most basic physical sense.48
Like Justice Handler, this judge believed that a broader array of human
concerns, such as lack of privacy and complete dependence on others,
should have material significance in best interests evaluations.49 Without
this broader approach, he predicted, “large numbers of people will be
thoughtlessly and automatically compelled to continue lives of intolerable
bleakness.”50
Yet, the broader approach to best interests has its critics too. Critics
fear that the approach opens the door to decisions that undervalue the
lives of people with intellectual disabilities. A Massachusetts case, In re
Hier,51 shows how this can happen. Ninety-two-year-old Mary Hier had
been institutionalized for psychiatric problems for much of her life.52 A
decade earlier, she had developed digestive system problems, and doctors
had surgically implanted a tube to supply her with adequate nutrition.53
Shortly after her transfer to a new living facility, she pulled out the tube
and then seemed to oppose any effort to replace it.54
Hier was eventually transferred to a hospital, and the case went to
43. Id. at 1249–50.
44. In re Visbeck, 510 A.2d 125, 126 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
45. Id. at 127.
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id. at 133.
48. Id. at 131.
49. See id. at 131–33.
50. Id. at 133.
51. 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
52. Id. at 960–61.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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court.55 Based on a benefit-burden analysis, a trial judge refused to au-
thorize surgery to replace the tube.56 An appellate court agreed, stressing
the intrusiveness of the procedure, Hier’s resistance, and the likelihood
that she would pull out the new tube.57 The judges said nothing about the
possible pain and distress that Hier, an otherwise healthy and ambulatory
person, could experience if deprived of nourishment. Nor did they con-
sider whether she would gain pleasure and enjoyment from the life that
continued nutritional support would provide (she reportedly thought she
was the Queen of England).58
The appellate court characterized Hier’s actions as “a plea for privacy
and personal dignity by a ninety-two year old person who is seriously ill
and for whom life has little left to offer.”59 The judges failed to consider
the possibility that she might have other motivations for behaving as she
did, such as dissatisfaction with her new living quarters.60 In short, the
court’s benefit-burden calculation seemed to devalue Hier’s life, reflect-
ing a potentially biased evaluation of her situation, rather than a patient-
centered assessment of her interests.
These cases, together with the dissenting opinions in Cruzan, reveal
disagreements over the nature and application of the best interests stan-
dard. Legal authorities have yet to resolve a central question raised by
the standard: should treatment decisions rely only on burdens and bene-
fits that a patient herself experiences or should other factors, such as the
interests a patient had before becoming incompetent or the concerns of a
generalized “reasonable person,” also play a significant role? In Part III, I
consider this question.
III. BEST INTERESTS DISAGREEMENTS
The legal disagreements described in Part II are traceable to a philo-
sophical disagreement over how to evaluate the incompetent patient’s
welfare. The general disagreement concerns whether judgments about
what was good for an individual in the past should influence decisions on
what would be good for that person now. The debate is about the best
interests standard’s conception of patient welfare, not the conception of
individual autonomy supporting the subjective standard. Thus, it applies
55. Id.
56. Id. at 964.
57. Id.
58. See George J. Annas, The Case of Mary Hier: When Substituted Judgment Becomes
Sleight of Hand, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Aug. 1984, at 23, 23–24.
59. Hier, 464 N.E.2d at 965. The court applied the substituted judgment standard, but
because there was no evidence of Hier’s prior competent preferences, the ruling was based
on an objective analysis of the benefits and burdens of her medical options. Id. at 964–65.
60. Annas, supra note 58, at 25. Hier’s guardian ad litem returned to court with more
medical testimony and ultimately obtained an order authorizing the surgery. See Rebecca
Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REV.
609, 713 (1994) [hereinafter Dresser, Missing Persons]. According to one of her physicians,
she lived for several years after the court-ordered surgery. Id.
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to cases in which there is no clear evidence of a patient’s former treat-
ment preferences.
There are two main versions of the debate. One asks whether the best
interests standard should include consideration of the desires and inter-
ests a specific patient possessed at an earlier time in life. The other asks
whether the standard should include considerations that a reasonable
person would have in the patient’s situation. I examine each version of
the debate below.
A. INCOMPETENT PATIENTS’ FORMER INTERESTS
Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin made one of the best-known cases
for including individual patients’ past interests in best interests assess-
ments.61 His argument rests on a general conception of human interests.
Throughout our lives, he said, we strive to promote two types of inter-
ests.62 We engage in some activities because they give us pleasure and
enjoyment—good experiences.63 Through these pursuits, we seek to sat-
isfy what Dworkin called our experiential interests.64 We also engage in
activities to satisfy what he called our “critical interests”: working on rela-
tionships, careers, and other personally meaningful endeavors.65 Though
at times difficult, satisfying our critical interests is part of living a good
life. Because it is the pursuit of critical interests that gives our lives genu-
ine meaning and coherence, Dworkin contended, critical interests have
the highest moral significance.66
Their interest in living their lives according to a coherent narrative
structure gives people an interest in the way their lives end, Dworkin as-
serted.67 This means that people have critical interests in the medical
treatment they receive after the onset of incapacity. According to Dwor-
kin, these critical interests affect patients’ welfare even when they can no
longer appreciate their previous concerns.68 On this view, part of giving
someone a good life involves satisfying the critical interests that an indi-
vidual had before being diagnosed with dementia. Moreover, because
critical interests have the highest moral significance, they take priority
over a dementia patient’s contemporaneous experiential interests in re-
ceiving care that promotes her current well-being.
Dworkin’s conception of the best interests standard departs from the
standard’s traditional focus on patients’ contemporaneous welfare.69 Best
61. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 199–237 (1993).







69. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 688–89 (Ariz. 1987) (stating guard-
ian for incompetent patient should promote the “best interests and temporal, moral and
mental welfare of a living person” (quoting Countryman v. Henderson, 496 P.2d 861, 863
(Ariz. 1972))).
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interests evaluations, he argued, should determine which decision would
be best for the person’s life overall.70 Consider, for example, a person
with dementia whose career as a philosophy professor was once essential
to his well-being. That person’s welfare as a dementia patient would con-
tinue to depend on his ability to pursue that career, even if he appears to
be content and no longer concerned with his previous work. According to
Dworkin, the individual’s critical interests in maintaining his former ca-
reer could justify a best interests decision to refrain from providing a
treatment that would promote the individual’s contemporaneous experi-
ential interests.71
Other philosophers have a different view of human welfare, however,
including the welfare of dementia patients. Jennifer Hawkins is one of
them.72 Hawkins questions the rationale for a best interests standard that
encompasses a person’s whole life, rather than the person’s present
circumstances.73
We generally recognize that people have different interests during the
course of their lives, Hawkins observes.74 And because a person’s inter-
ests vary over time, they sometimes conflict,75 as they do in the example
of the dementia patient described above. The person whose welfare once
depended on his philosophy career now has a different set of welfare in-
terests. The most defensible conception of such a patient’s welfare looks
to his current interests, Hawkins contends, not his interests at some other
time in his life.76
As Hawkins points out, we don’t normally think about a person’s wel-
fare from the perspective of her life as a whole.77 Ideas about what ca-
reers, relationships, and living circumstances would be best for an
individual change through the years. To counter the whole-life conception
of individual welfare, Hawkins adopts a form of the “experience require-
ment” for welfare evaluations.78 According to Hawkins, when someone
“has changed enough that she is no longer capable of responding posi-
tively to some putative good, then . . . that thing is no longer good for
her.”79 Thus, although that person’s past critical interests might shape ap-
plication of the subjective standard for treatment decision-making, those
interests should not influence decisions about her best interests as a per-
son with dementia.
Competing views of the proper conception of individual welfare have
important implications for applications of the best interests standard.
Whole-life conceptions like Dworkin’s permit best interests decisions
70. See DWORKIN, supra note 61, at 199.
71. See id. at 229–33.
72. See Jennifer Hawkins, Well-Being, Time, and Dementia, 124 ETHICS 507 (2014).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 514.
75. Id. at 514–15.
76. Id. at 542.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 539.
79. Id.
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based on concerns that incompetent patients are no longer able to appre-
ciate. In contrast, welfare conceptions calibrated to the individual’s ex-
isting abilities limit best interests assessments to the burdens and benefits
that dementia patients remain able to experience.
Adopting an experience requirement for best interests assessments
doesn’t necessarily exclude individual patients’ past welfare interests
from treatment decision-making. Clear evidence of a patient’s past inter-
ests can shape how the subjective standard is applied in that case. Moreo-
ver, people with dementia can remain capable of appreciating their
former pursuits. For example, someone who was once a painter might
continue to value and enjoy painting for years after a dementia diagnosis.
Such an individual would benefit from receiving treatment that would
enable him to continue painting. Conversely, someone who always pre-
ferred to live in solitude might have an extremely negative response to
living in a dementia care facility. Such a response would be one factor to
take into account in evaluating potential treatment options for that
individual.
B. REASONABLE PERSON INTERESTS
As I noted in Part II, some judges believe that the perspective of a
generalized reasonable person should influence best interests decision-
making. Many scholars share this position. Conceptual analyses of the
best interests standard often refer to reasonable person views, adopting
some version of the following statement: “[E]ven when the individual pa-
tient’s wishes or preferences are not known, we can look at the patient’s
quality of life and make a judgment based on what a reasonable person
would consider beneficial and, therefore, would prefer in such a
circumstance.”80
Such formulations of the best interests standard are common, but they
typically fail to specify the precise role of reasonable person judgments.
As I said earlier, best interests evaluations incorporate judgments on
what makes life good and bad for people. For example, a choice to forgo
treatment because it would result in overwhelming pain and distress re-
lies on two findings. One is that a life involving overwhelming pain and
distress is not one that reasonable people would consider valuable. The
other is that the patient herself is likely to respond negatively to the kind
of pain and distress that treatment would impose. But writers don’t al-
ways clarify whether the second judgment is required. The question here
is similar to the one discussed in the previous section: should the patient’s
capacity to appreciate reasonable person considerations be required?
It is widely agreed that best interests decision-making demands quality
of life assessments: how would the burdens and benefits of different treat-
ment options affect a particular incompetent patient? Rather than consid-
ering the utility or value a patient’s life has to others, best interests
80. Drane & Coulehan, supra note 36, at 23.
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evaluations consider “the value or quality of an individual’s life to that
individual.”81 In this kind of quality of life assessment,
[t]he question is not whether the patient’s quality of life is below
average, or worse than it used to be, or anything of the sort. Instead,
the proper quality of life judgment is only whether the quality of the
patient’s life with the life-sustaining treatment will be so poor as to
be not worth living or worse than no further life at all.82
Adopting an experience requirement limits best interests considera-
tions to the benefits and burdens that specific incompetent patients can
appreciate. Thus, burdens like loss of dignity and personal privacy should
be influential only when they appear to matter to the patients themselves.
Unless there is behavioral evidence that a patient cares about these
things, they should be excluded from best interests evaluations.83
But there is also support for a more expansive view of patient interests.
Some scholars join Justices Stevens and Brennan in arguing that consider-
ations like loss of dignity should play a role, even when patients them-
selves are unconcerned about these matters. They share the Visbeck
judge’s worry that, with a narrow approach to best interests evaluations,
“large numbers of people will be thoughtlessly and automatically com-
pelled to continue lives of intolerable bleakness.”84 They believe that im-
posing an experience requirement will lead to best interests decisions that
omit much of what is important about being human, treating patients as
“little more than objects in the world.”85
The question is whether the expansive approach supplies sufficient pro-
tection to vulnerable incapacitated individuals. Empirical research shows
that people living with disabilities report having a better quality of life
than healthy people think they have.86 There is a “disability perspectives
gap” between how people with disabilities rate their lives and how
nondisabled people rate them.87 Without an experience requirement, the
best interests standard could permit withholding or withdrawing treat-
ment from cognitively impaired people living lives that are valuable to
them.
81. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 30, at 124.
82. Id. In contrast, “interpersonal” or “social utility” quality-of-life assessments “rank
the worth of [the] individual relative to the worth of others, usually for the purpose of
calculating the costs and benefits of expending resources upon the person.” Id.
83. See, e.g., Howard Brody & William G. Bartholome, In the Best Interests of. . .,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Dec. 1988, at 37, 37 (“[F]or me to have an ‘interest’ in something,
whether or not I have that something must make a difference to me; and this requires in
turn that I have the mental capacity to be aware of that something, and of myself as pos-
sessing or lacking it.” (emphasis added)).
84. In re Visbeck, 510 A.2d 125, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
85. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 409; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
supra note 8, at 171 (stating that aggressive treatment “may turn the person entirely into an
object” and “a mere receptacle of technical intervention”).
86. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1389–90
(2012).
87. Id. at 1389.
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Some scholars look to empirical information to help reconcile these
two positions. The most sophisticated idea to date comes from Annette
Rid and David Wendler.88 Their proposal, called the “Patient Preference
Predictor,” would rely on survey data obtained from a representative
group of people in a specific area.89 The survey would collect demo-
graphic data, experiences with medical care, attitudes and values relevant
to quality of life, and preferences for resolving an array of treatment
questions that commonly arise in the care of incompetent patients.90
Rid and Wendler suggest that this information would help decision
makers apply the subjective standard to treatment decision-making by
“predict[ing] which treatment option an incapacitated patient is most
likely to prefer in the circumstances based on the patient’s own character-
istics.”91 In light of the law’s insistence that applications of the subjective
standard rest on evidence of a patient’s actual expressed preferences,
however, I think it is more likely that the survey information would be
used in applications of the best interests standard to ascertain the views
of a reasonable person in the patient’s situation.92
Yet the Patient Preference Predictor wouldn’t necessarily offer reassur-
ance to people worried about protecting incompetent patients from bi-
ased quality-of-life assessments. Rid and Wendler would include patients
and people with disabilities in the survey sample, collecting information
from individuals who know what it is like to live with different health
conditions.93 But the survey would collect data only from competent indi-
viduals, thus excluding the vast majority of people with dementia.94 Be-
cause few of the respondents would have personal perspectives on what it
is like to live with dementia, survey findings could reflect inaccurate ideas
about dementia patients’ quality of life.95
The Patient Preference Predictor and other empirical investigations
would generate information on how the members of the general popula-
tion think about the benefits and burdens of life-sustaining treatment,
thus producing evidence-based reasonable person judgments. To protect
incompetent patients, however, such empirical evidence should be sup-
plemented by evidence gleaned from close and systematic examination of
88. Annette Rid & David Wendler, Use of a Patient Preference Predictor to Help Make
Medical Decisions for Incapacitated Patients, 39 J. MED. & PHIL. 104 (2014).
89. Id. at 119–20.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 105.
92. See Rebecca Dresser, Law, Ethics, and the Patient Preference Predictor, 39 J. MED.
& PHIL. 178, 180 (2014).
93. See Rid & Wendler, supra note 88, at 12.
94. Id.; see Jason Karlawish et al., The Ability of Persons with Alzheimer Disease (AD)
to Make a Decision About Taking an AD Treatment, 64 NEUROLOGY 1514, 1514 (2005)
(finding majority of interviewees with mild to moderate Alzheimer’s disease incompetent
to make treatment decisions).
95. As one expert observes, “people with dementia often come to terms with the con-
sequences of their disease and adapt” to their new circumstances. C.M.P.M. Hertogh, The
Role of Advance Euthanasia Directives as an Aid to Communication and Shared Decision-
Making in Dementia, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 100, 101 (2009).
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the individual patient whose care is at issue. Justice Stevens and other
judges defending the inclusion of reasonable person concerns in best in-
terests decision-making have recognized the need for such an examina-
tion, especially in cases involving conscious, incompetent patients. In the
remainder of this article, I describe how this approach can promote pa-
tient protection while respecting community values on what makes life
worth living.
IV. AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO EVALUATING
PATIENTS’ INTERESTS
In his discussion of best interests evaluations for incompetent patients,
Justice Stevens acknowledged the need for procedural safeguards, includ-
ing a “searching inquiry” into the individual patient’s actual interests.96
Applying the best interests standard requires decision makers to examine
what life is like for a specific incompetent patient, as well as to predict
how various treatment options would change that life for good or for bad.
Some scholars wonder whether such an inquiry is legitimate. Skeptics
claim that incompetent patients’ interests are mysterious, too difficult for
outside observers to determine.97 A related criticism is that the standard
is too vague, giving decision makers too much room for speculation about
appropriate treatment choices.98
Such skepticism is misplaced, in my view. To be sure, our ability to gain
access to the inner worlds of other people is limited. Yet, in everyday life,
as well as formal legal proceedings, we rely on judgments about the
mental states of others, including those of infants and other people whose
intellectual capacities are quite different from our own.99
Excluding people with dementia from this process would have serious
moral implications, dismissing our responsibilities to this population. As
philosopher Grant Gillett observed, “If there is nothing it is like to be a
thing of a certain type then our treatment of that thing does not directly
matter in a way that counts morally.”100 Such an exclusion would also be
impractical. Approximating the dementia patient’s point of view is an es-
sential part of interacting with people with dementia, something
caregivers and clinicians do all the time.
Moreover, there is a wealth of information available to help decision
makers assess dementia patients’ subjective experiences. A rapidly ex-
panding literature describes the experiences of people living with demen-
tia and the conditions that can make life good or bad for them. Patients
themselves are a major source of information. Many people with demen-
96. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 353 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
97. See Loretta M. Kopelman, Why the Best Interest Standard Is Not Self-Defeating,
Too Individualistic, Unknowable, Vague or Subjective, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34, 34 (2018).
98. See id.
99. For further discussion of these points, see Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 60.
100. Grant Gillett, Consciousness, the Brain and What Matters, 4 BIOETHICS 181, 181
(1990).
2020] Beyond Cruzan 85
tia retain the ability to communicate about matters relevant to treatment
decision-making and more of them are writing and speaking about their
situations.101 People with close relationships to dementia patients are
writing and speaking about the condition as well, relaying a more com-
plex and positive account than popular stereotypes convey.102
These accounts often emphasize the ongoing abilities of people with
dementia to engage in valuable parts of human life. For example, psychol-
ogist Steven Sabat writes about many interactions in which affected indi-
viduals “feel and show love for and gratitude toward others; . . . display
and appreciate humor and other valued emotions; . . . have meaningful
thoughts even if they are unexpressed in words; . . . express themselves
creatively”; and exhibit a multitude of other strengths and abilities.103 He
also describes what families, clinicians, and other unaffected people must
learn to effectively communicate and interact with affected individuals.104
In sum, a growing body of literature offers personal perspectives on
dementia patients’ quality of life and the potential effects of administer-
ing different treatment interventions. Experts have developed behavioral
techniques for assessing patients’ well-being too.105 They have studied
how dementia patients respond to interventions like feeding tubes.106
They have also studied how patients respond to hospitalization and other
disruptions that can accompany treatment, as well as ways to reduce such
disruptions.107 Legal authorities should recognize and promote the use of
such measures in best interests evaluations.
Legal authorities should also guard against overly simplistic interpreta-
tions of patient responses. People lacking decision-making capacity, in-
cluding people with dementia, often have preferences about how they
want their lives to go. Although their intellectual disabilities prevent such
individuals from making fully informed and autonomous choices, the val-
101. See, e.g., N.R. Kleinfield, Fraying at the Edges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/01/nyregion/living-with-alzheimers.html [https://
perma.cc/V8S7-SAHQ]; Paula Span, Dementia Is Getting Some Very Public Faces, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/health/alzheimers-dementia-ce-
lebrities.html [https://perma.cc/ZV96-B6VP].
102. See, e.g., Sharon R. Kaufman, “Losing My Self”: A Poet’s Ironies and a Daughter’s
Reflections on Dementia, 60 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 549, 549–50 (2017); Janelle S. Taylor,
On Recognition, Caring, and Dementia, 22 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 313, 314 (2008).
103. STEVEN R. SABAT, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND DEMENTIA: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 203–04 (2018).
104. Id. at 177–92.
105. See, e.g., Hanneke C. Beerens et al., The Association Between Aspects of Daily Life
and Quality of Life of People with Dementia Living in Long-Term Care Facilities: A Mo-
mentary Assessment Study, 28 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 1323, 1324 (2016).
106. See, e.g., Joan M. Teno et al., Does Feeding Tube Insertion and Its Timing Improve
Survival?, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1918, 1918 (2012) (finding absence of benefits from
tube feeding in people with advanced dementia).
107. See, e.g., Saskia N. Sivananthan & Kimberlyn M. McGrail, Diagnosis and Disrup-
tion: Population-Level Analysis Identifying Points of Care at Which Transitions Are Highest
for People with Dementia and Factors That Contribute to Them, 64 J. AM. GERIATRICS
SOC’Y 569, 569 (2016) (noting the value of high quality primary care and recommended
dementia care in reducing stressful hospitalizations and moves from one location to
another).
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ues of respect and liberty support giving them a role in decisions about
the medical treatment they receive.108 The emerging practice of sup-
ported decision-making gives incompetent patients such a role.109 Yet,
because incompetent patients are relatively susceptible to confusion, mis-
understanding, and undue influence, their preferences shouldn’t necessa-
rily determine whether they receive treatment.110
Observers assessing the interests of incompetent patients must inter-
pret patients’ responses in light of their mental capacities. People unable
to understand or remember the reasons for medical interventions are
more likely to be frightened by the demands and effects of such interven-
tions. Their incapacities can make even minor treatment efforts more
burdensome than they would be for someone with a higher level of un-
derstanding.111 On the other hand, patients’ lack of understanding can
reduce treatment burdens. For example, when people with dementia can-
not comprehend that they are facing a life-threatening situation, they es-
cape some of the psychological burdens typically experienced by
competent people in such a situation.112
I don’t mean to suggest that it’s always easy to evaluate the interests of
people with dementia. As in the case of Mary Hier, interpreting patients’
behavior can be challenging. To the judges, Hier seemed to be expressing
a wish to be left alone, even if the consequences would be discomfort and
eventual death.113 But critics of the ruling suggested that she was instead
reacting to a change in her surroundings.114 They cited evidence that she
experienced hunger, based on her tendency to steal food from others.115
They also pointed to evidence that she enjoyed her life, countering the
image presented in the two court opinions.116 As a result, they said, de-
priving Hier of nutrition would devalue her life and impose unacceptable
burdens on her.117
Surrogate decision makers and clinicians must not allow patient prefer-
ences to become an automatic excuse for decisions to forgo life-sustaining
measures.118 The best response to the challenge of evaluating dementia
108. See Jason Adam Wasserman & Mark Christopher Navin, Capacity for Preferences:
Respecting Patients with Compromised Decision-Making, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June
2018, at 31, 35–36; see also Miller, supra note 36, at 2924–25 (arguing that incompetent
patients’ expressed preferences are a form of autonomy that should receive serious consid-
eration in best interests decision-making).
109. See Renu Barton-Hanson, Reforming Best Interests: The Road Towards Supported
Decision-Making, 40 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 277, 280 (2018).
110. See Miller, supra note 36, at 2913–15.
111. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 171–92 (describing ex-
amples of this phenomenon).
112. See, e.g., Diana Whitney, Dementia’s Gift: Facing Cancer Without the Fear, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/well/family/dementias-gift-fac-
ing-cancer-without-the-fear.html [https://perma.cc/CUY9-C9Q5].
113. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964–65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
114. Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 60, at 655–56.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See Annas, supra note 58, at 25.
118. See Barton-Hanson, supra note 109, at 293; Miller, supra note 36, at 2924.
2020] Beyond Cruzan 87
patients’ interests is to require systematic and rigorous assessments of
their capacities and perceptions, including any verbal or behavioral indi-
cations of their subjective quality of life and attitudes toward treatment.
Legal authorities should require a thorough assessment by knowledgea-
ble professionals and caregivers familiar with the individual patients’
daily lives. Mandating assessment by multiple persons can reduce the
chance that observer biases will improperly influence treatment
choices.119
Legal authorities should also require decision makers to explore treat-
ment alternatives to determine the least burdensome care options, includ-
ing palliative measures when interventions are withheld or withdrawn. If
it is difficult to predict how a specific patient will react to a medical inter-
vention, authorities should advise a treatment trial to determine the pa-
tient’s actual response. Measures like these can protect patients from
unjustified decisions to administer or forgo life-sustaining interventions.
V. DETERMINING AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF BEST
INTERESTS DECISIONS
Decisions based on the best interests standard are more defensible
when supported by informed and systematic examinations of incompe-
tent patients’ subjective experiences. Such examinations will help deci-
sion makers develop a reliable picture of the positive and negative effects
different treatment options could have on a patient.
But there is another essential element of the best interests evaluation:
determining the balance of burdens and benefits that justifies a particular
treatment decision. In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed
life-sustaining interventions to be forgone only if they would lead to “re-
curring, unavoidable and severe pain” for incompetent patients.120 As I
have described, however, many courts, as well as scholars, favor a more
expansive approach that allows nontreatment in a wider range of circum-
stances. Advocates for an expanded approach focus on two groups of pa-
tients. One group includes people with low levels of conscious awareness
due to dementia. The other includes people who would experience con-
siderable burdens if treatment were provided, although not the severe
and unremitting pain that Conroy required.
Judges and scholars defending nontreatment in a broader range of situ-
ations than Conroy allows often focus on the situation of permanently
unconscious patients like Nancy Cruzan. These judges and scholars take
positions similar to those of Justices Stevens and Brennan, arguing that
permanently unconscious patients lack the experiential interests that
119. See Carolyn Johnston, The Weight Attributed to Patient Values in Determining Best
Interests, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 562, 562–63 (2013) (describing case in which nursing home
staff presented more positive view of dementia patient’s life than family did).
120. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985).
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could give them a personal stake in continued life.121 Defenders of this
position say that surrogate decision makers should be permitted to
choose to forgo treatment, for there is good evidence that most compe-
tent persons would see this as a reasonable choice.
This argument cannot be applied in most cases involving people with
dementia, however. End-stage dementia can produce unconsciousness,
but treatment questions often arise before that stage. Dementia patients
typically have experiential interests that best interests decisions must pro-
tect. What combination of benefits and burdens gives conscious patients a
clear interest in receiving treatment? Conversely, in what situations are
conscious dementia patients’ interests in continued life slight or uncertain
enough to permit forgoing treatment? Few judges and scholars offer in-
depth analysis of these questions.
In an effort to promote such analysis, I offer the following thoughts.
There are many different variables at play in individual patients’ situa-
tions, so each dementia case requires its own benefit-burden analysis. At
the same time, some general observations apply to patients sharing cer-
tain characteristics relevant to treatment decision-making.
By the time they enter the final stages of dementia, patients have lost
many of their previous cognitive and physical capacities.122 At some
point, these patients appear “barely conscious,”123 as was the case with
Claire Conroy. She rarely responded to those around her, sometimes
moaning when caregivers moved her or changed her bandages and some-
times smiling when they combed her hair.124
Their cognitive impairments leave patients like Conroy capable of ex-
periencing sensations like pain and pleasure but not much else.125 Pa-
tients reaching this stage of the disease also have a relatively limited life
expectancy no matter what medical efforts are made.126 Philosopher Dan
Brock has argued that patients with severe dementia have “an interest in
receiving pleasure . . . while, they continue to live, but not an interest in
continuing to live in order to receive any pleasures that might be possible
for them.”127 As long as they are kept comfortable in the dying process,
many commentators think the best interests standard should permit deci-
sions to forgo potentially burdensome interventions like feeding tubes.128
121. The general consensus is that the small possibility of misdiagnosis or future cure is
not enough to give such patients significant interests in continued treatment. See
BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 30, at 126–32.
122. See generally Rebecca Dresser & Peter J. Whitehouse, The Incompetent Patient on
the Slippery Slope, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 1994, at 6, 9.
123. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 376–77.
124. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1217.
125. See Greg A. Sachs, Dying from Dementia, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1595, 1595–96
(2009) (describing people with late-stage dementia).
126. See Susan L. Mitchell et al., The Clinical Course of Advanced Dementia, 361 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1529, 1535 (2009) (citing infections and eating problems as associated with
low survival rates in people with advanced dementia).
127. Dan W. Brock, Justice and the Severely Demented Elderly, 13 J. MED. & PHIL. 73,
90 (1988).
128. See, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 126, at 1533–35; Sachs, supra note 125, at 1596.
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Other dementia patients are severely impaired but more aware than
Conroy was. People in this group resemble the patient in Visbeck, who
was somewhat responsive to others and did not appear to be suffering.129
Because placement of a feeding tube would not inflict the level of suffer-
ing Conroy described, the judge in that case ordered the procedure.130 At
the same time, he voiced his opposition to Conroy’s strict approach.131
The demand for severe suffering, he contended, meant that patients like
Elizabeth Visbeck would be condemned to lives of “intolerable
bleakness.”132
It’s likely that many people would agree with this sentiment. For them,
a decision to forgo treatment for someone in Visbeck’s situation would be
respectful and reasonable as long as she could be kept comfortable during
the dying process. Continued life offers such restricted benefits to pa-
tients like this that any potential treatment burdens are sufficient to jus-
tify nontreatment under the best interests standard. The discomfort,
distress, fatigue, and other potential negative effects of medical interven-
tions should be enough to permit nontreatment in these kinds of cases.
At the same time, many people with dementia remain capable of par-
ticipating in activities and interactions that are meaningful to them.133
They may be confused and unhappy at times, but they are for the most
part content and comfortable. Although many competent people might
consider such an existence unsatisfactory, even undignified, withholding
low-burden treatments from patients like this would devalue the lives of
individuals with significant experiential interests in continued life. Unless
there is solid evidence that treatment would impose heavy burdens on
such patients, the best interests standard should require a decision in
favor of treatment.134 Legal decision makers should require treatment tri-
als and a search for less burdensome treatment alternatives before au-
thorizing nontreatment of patients like Mary Hier.
VI. CONCLUSION
Scholars assign two different roles to the best interests standard in legal
and clinical decision-making. One is to “express moral, legal, medical, or
other social goals or ideals that should guide choices.”135 In this role, the
best interests standard encourages decision makers to focus on the indi-
vidual patient’s well-being and to recognize that a patient’s subjective
quality of life depends not only on health and medical care, but on living
129. In re Visbeck, 510 A.2d 125, 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 131.
132. Id. at 133.
133. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
134. See Hawkins, supra note 72, at 508–09, 538.
135. Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated
Persons of All Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2007).
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situations, social interactions, and so forth.136
This aspirational part of the best interests standard has been neglected
in the debate over treatment decision-making for people with dementia.
Certain environmental and social conditions can make life better for peo-
ple with dementia, offering ways to improve their subjective quality of
life and reduce the burdens that life-sustaining interventions can impose.
Decisions on life-sustaining care for dementia patients should take into
account developments in this area.137
The best interests standard’s second role is to delineate the scope of
permissible decisions. The standard does not require decision makers to
choose a single best option; instead, it requires them to choose an option
within the “zone of discretion” for such decision makers.138 Legal appli-
cations of the best interests standard delineate the kinds of decisions
within the zone of discretion, as well as decisions exceeding the bounds of
acceptability.
Ethicists and other scholars generally rely on the concept of reasona-
bleness to establish the boundaries of best interests decision-making. But
neither a legal nor scholarly consensus exists regarding reasonable deci-
sions for a large number of conscious dementia patients. In what circum-
stances is it reasonable to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from patients like Conroy, Visbeck, and Hier? There is an urgent need
for legal clarification of those circumstances.
The boundaries of acceptable best interests decisions for people with
dementia are not as clear as they should be. According to the Supreme
Court’s Cruzan decision, authorities in the “laboratory of the states” are
empowered to establish these boundaries.139 State authorities have been
too slow to exercise their responsibilities in this area. Families, clinicians,
and the public need more legal guidance on permissible treatment op-
tions for people with dementia. Legal authorities must join with clini-
cians, scholars, and the public to develop an informed and defensible
approach to protecting dementia patients’ interests in decisions about
life-sustaining treatment.
136. See, e.g., Johan Christiaan Bester, The Harm Principle Cannot Replace the Best
Interest Standard: Problems with Using the Harm Principle for Medical Decision Making
for Children, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8, 9 (2018); Janet Malek, What Really Is in a Child’s Best
Interest? Toward a More Precise Picture of the Interests of Children, 20 J. CLIN. ETHICS 175,
181 (2009).
137. See Shih-Yin Lin & Frances Marcus Lewis, Dementia Friendly, Dementia Capable,
and Dementia Positive: Concepts to Prepare for the Future, 55 GERONTOLOGIST 237, 240–42
(2015); Antonio Guaita & Marc Jones, A “Prosthetic” Approach for Individuals With De-
mentia?, 305 JAMA 402, 402–03 (2011).
138. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Best Interest Standard for Health Care Decision
Making: Definition and Defense, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8, 36–37 (2018).
139. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990).
